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This work considers the use of subsidy as channel coordination strategy in vertical cooperative 
advertising in which the manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader and the retailer is the follower. 
While the retailer is directly involved in advertising, the manufacturer is indirectly involved through the 
provision of subsidy to aid the retailer in advertising the product. The work models the demand function 
using a multiplicative advertising-price-demand function, and obtains the players’ prices, the retail 
advertising effort, the manufacturer’s subsidy rate and the payoffs. The work observes that with 
increasing subsidy, the manufacturer’s price margin increases while that of the retailer reduces and 
eventual becomes zero with total subsidy. However, the manufacturer should not totally subsidise retail 
advertising since it would be counterproductive for him, while at the same time would lead to very large 
retail payoff. Thus with appropriate subsidy strategy, the prices and the payoffs, and eventually the 
entire channel can be coordinated. 
Keywords: Channel coordination, Vertical cooperative advertising, Stackelberg game, Advertising 
price-demand function, Subsidy rate. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cooperative advertising is an advertising 
arrangement in which the manufacturer pays for 
a fraction of the advertising cost which the 
retailer incurs in the process of advertising the 
manufacturer’s product. In the cooperative 
advertising literature Berger (1972) is 
considered to be the first to develop a 
mathematical model on cooperative advertising. 
He considered cooperative advertising support 
as price discount from the supplier 
(manufacturer) to the retailer. Based on his 
work, Dant and Berger (1996) considered 
cooperative advertising in a franchising system. 
Bergen and John (1997) considered the effect 
of horizontal level competition among retailers 
and among manufacturers, and advertising 
spillover on subsidy (participation) rate and 
concluded on guidelines for the provision of 
subsidy. Huang et al. (2002) worked on a 
manufacturer-retailer situation where the 
manufacturer is the channel leader, and when 
the channel members are involved in 
partnership. They observed that the payoff is 
larger in a partnership. Another consideration of 
partnership relationship in cooperative 
advertising was done by Xie and Wei (2009) in 
their work on channel coordination. They 
studied a noncooperative Stackelberg game 
and Nash cooperative game. They observed 
that a cooperative relationship results in better 
channel coordination. In a shift from the 
traditional bilateral monopolistic model Wang et 
al. (2011) considered cooperative advertising 
involving a monopolistic manufacturer and 
competing retailers in a duopoly using four 
game structures. They observed that to achieve 
good channel coordination the players should 
engage in cost-sharing contract. Another 
consideration of a situation involving a 
manufacturer and two retailers was considered 
by Ghadimi et al. (2013). Using the concepts of 
cooperative games and group equilibria they 
obtained an appropriate allocation strategy for 
sharing channel profit. Further, another 
consideration of cooperative advertising using 
one manufacturer and two retailers was 
considered by Aust and Buscher (2014). They 
observed that demand is sensitive to 
advertising and price. They also observed that 
end-users benefit from retail competition, and 
that integration is not usually suitable for retail-
duopoly. 
 
It is a known fact that uncoordinated channel 
leads to double marginalization leading to 
inefficiencies (Gerstner and Hess, 1995). 
Hence, channel coordination is very important. 
Ezimadu: Modelling Subsidy as a Cooperative Advertising Channel Coordination Mechanism 
128 
Kazemi and SaeedMohammadi (2016) 
employed cooperative advertising together with 
price to coordinate a two-level channel. 
Tibrewala et al. (2018) devised a strategy for 
coordinating a two-stage supply channel for a 
product that has a known expiration date 
(limited life span). They noted that proper 
coordination leads to increase in channel payoff 
and also reduces the resultant effect of demand 
uncertainty on payoff. Cooperative advertising 
is an effective tool in channel coordination as 
observed by Lu and Zhang (2019). They 
observed that channel members can find 
themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma, of which 
cooperative advertising provides an escape 
route. 
 
Cooperative advertising models are 
characterised by the support given by the 
manufacturer to the retailer. This is usually 
referred to as subsidy. Considering a two-
period bilateral monopoly, Martin-Herran and 
Sigue (2017) observed that the retailer should 
engage in advertising the manufacturer’s 
product in both periods, but should only be 
provided with subsidy in the second period. 
Ezimadu and Nwozo (2018) compared a 
situation where the manufacturer subsidises 
retail advertising while still engaging in 
manufacturer’s national advertising, with the 
situation in He et al. (2009) where the 
manufacturer subsidises retail advertising 
without directly engaging in advertising. They 
showed that the manufacturer’s direct 
involvement in advertising should be 
encouraged. In an extension of the traditional 
cooperative advertising model from a 
manufacturer-retailer to a manufacturer-
distributor-retailer setting Ezimadu (2019) 
considered a channel structure involving the 
transfer of subsidy from the manufacturer to the 
retailer through the distributor. He observed that 
the channel members should ensure that the 
manufacturer’s provided subsidy reaches the 
retailer, and in the event that the manufacturer 
does not provide subsidy, the distributor should 
step in to subsidise retail advertising. 
 
Works in the cooperative advertising literature 
usually consider the effect of price, demand, 
subsidy, quality and the likes on the payoffs, but 
have not been able to capture the possibility of 
switching between subsidy and wholesale price 
margin which by extension influences the retail 
price. This is the centre of this work. Thus, we 
consider for the first time a situation where price 
margin and subsidy can be interchanged 
purposely for channel coordination. We attempt 
to provide advice for managerial 
implementation in cooperative advertising in a 
bilateral monopoly. The work addresses the 
condition under which the manufacturer should 
totally subsidise retail advertising, and 
determine whether the wholesale price can be 
strategically used to determine the optimal 
subsidy rate. Further, it will determine whether 




In this work we assume that the retailer sells 
only the manufacturer’s product brand within 
the product class. To increase product demand 
he (the retailer) engages in advertising, while 
the manufacturer on the other hand supports 
him by subsidising his advertising expenditure. 
 
List of Notations 
We will use of the following notations: 
     Wholesale price (The price the 
manufacturer sells the product to the retailer) 
      Retail Price (The price the 
retailer sells the product to the consumers) 
     Retail advertising effort 
  [   ] Subsidy rate given to the 
retailer by the manufacturer 
  (   ] Advertising effectiveness 
parameter 
     Rate of decrease of demand 
with respect to the retail price 
      Retailer’s payoff 
      Manufacturer’s payoff 
 
The Advertising-Price-Demand Function 
It is well known that advertising influences 
product demand (Xie and Wei (2009)). Also 
retail price affects demand (He et al 2009). 
Thus we use the multiplicative effect of 
advertising and price to model the end-user 
demand: 
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 (     )   (  ) (  )   
 
where (  ) is the impact of advertising on 
demand; and  (  ) is the impact of price on 
demand. This advertising-price-demand 
function is well known in the advertising 
literature (Kuehn, 1962; Xie and Wei, 2009). 
 
Now, considering the known saturation effect of 
advertising on sale we adopt the function 
 (  )     
 
     
 
where the advertising effectiveness parameter 
  indicates the effect of advertising on sale. 
Clearly this is a concave function of the 
advertising effort   . This ascertains the 
possibility of diminishing return on advertising 
which is a common phenomenon in the 
advertising literature.  
Just as it is in the cases of many other demand-
price models, we assume that demand is a 
linearly decreasing function of price. Thus we 
express the impact of price on demand as 
follows: 
 
 (  )          
where   is a positive constant. To simplify our 
discussion, we normalize the maximum value of 
  (  ) to 1. 
 
The Players’ Payoffs 
We observe that 
             
                
                                
Also we have that 
    
                            
       
                            
Thus we have that the manufacturer and 
retailer’s payoffs are given by: 
       (     )   
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and 
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(   )   (2) 
respectively. 
RESULTS 
The Optimal Problem, Strategies and 
Payoffs 
We model this work as a Stackelberg game in 
which the manufacturer being the game leader 
first announces his wholesale price   through 
which he intends to transfer the product to the 
retailer; and the participation (subsidy) rate   
which he intends to give the retailer as his 
advertising support. Subsequently the retailer 
takes a decision on his advertising effort    
and retail price    which he is willing to sell the 
product to the end-users. We obtain the 
Stackelberg equilibrium through backward 
induction by first solving the retailer’s optimal 
problem 
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Equating (4) to 0 we have: 
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Also from (3) we have that 
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Equating (6) to 0 we have 
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Now, from (2) and (5) we have that 
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From the above discussion we have the 
following result: 
Proposition 1  Given the retailer’s 
optimal problem (3), then the retailer’s 
advertising effort, price and payoff are given by 
(5), (7) and (8) respectively. 
 
From (1) we have that the manufacturer’s 
optimal problem is: 
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Using (5) and (7) in (9) we have 
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Equating (11) to 0 we have 
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Thus from (7) and (12) we have that 
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Equating (14) to 0 we have: 
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Now, from (10) and (15) we have that 
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Thus, from the above discussion we have the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 2: Given the manufacturer’s 
optimal problem (9), then the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price  , the subsidy rate  , and the 
payoff      are given by (12), (15) and (16) 
respectively. 
 
Unsubsidised and Subsidised Equilibrium 
Suppose the manufacturer does not subsidise 
the retail advertising effort, so that     , then 
we have an unsubsidised equilibrium. Thus (12) 
becomes 
   
 
  
     (  )  
Using (17) in (7) we have 
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Using (17) and (18) in (5) we have 
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Substituting (17), (18) and (19) into (2) we have that 









































Substituting (17), (18) and (19) into (1) we have that 




























With the provision of subsidy we have that (12) and (15) leads to 
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Observe that for    
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  which (from (1) and (2)) implies that  
             
implying that     
 
 
  is inappropriate.  
Now, using    
 
  
 in (7) we have 
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Thus 
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Using (15), (20) and (21) in (5) we have 
   





























From (2), (15), (20) and (21) we have that 
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From (1), (15), (20) and (22) we have that 







































      
DISCUSSION 
We recall that     measures the effectiveness 
of advertising, so that    (   ]. Thus we let 
     . Further,    measures the rate of 
decrease of the demand. As such we let 
        . 
 
Wholesale Price-Subsidy Coordination 
Observe from Figure 1 that when there is no 
subsidy the retail price    is larger than the 
manufacturer’s wholesaleprice   . This can be 
seen as the result of the retailer’s effort to 
ensure that he stays in business when there is 
no support for his advertising effort. Thus the 
larger retail price margin is a form of 
compensation for his advertising spending. As 
the subsidy increases towards 1 (total subsidy) 
we observe that both prices become equal, 




      
 
    
  (    )
  
              (    )   (    )(  
  )  
                    
                   
 
This means that the manufacturer can only be 
willing to totally subsidise retail advertising if 
and only if both prices are equal. That is if the 
retailer’s price margin is 0 (zero). But from (2) 
this will lead to         Thus, it is practically 
impossible since the retailer is in business to 
make profit. This is clear from Figure 1 which 
shows that as subsidy increases the 
manufacturer’s margin increases while the 
retailer’s margin reduces and eventually 




Figure 1: The effect of subsidy on the players’ 
prices 
 
However it is pertinent to note that the 
manufacturer must not totally subsidise the 
retail advertising effort. This is quite clear from 
(5) which suggests that total subsidy would lead 
to much advertising commitment such that the 
retailer’s effort would become unbounded. This 
is unrealistic! Further (8) shows that this total 
subsidy and subsequently possible larger 
advertising effort will lead to very large retailer’s 
payoff. In short it would lead to unbounded 
payoff. Again this is unrealistic. 
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On the other hand (10) shows that total subsidy 
will lead to a loss by the manufacturer. Observe 
from (10) that as     the term (   )  
approaches 0 (zero) faster than (   ). 
Consequently the term  
   
    (   ) 
(





becomes unbounded much faster than 
    
  (   )
(




. Thus      approaches a 
negative value as the subsidy gets very large. 
Thus the manufacturer should provide only the 
optimal subsidy rate.  
 
Obviously, with every additional increase in 
subsidy both players’ prices increase. However, 
the manufacturer’s rate of increase is higher 
than that of the retailer. This implies that for 
every additional unit of support to the retailer, 
the manufacturer should compensate himself 
by increasing his wholesale price. 
From the foregoing we observe that subsidy 
can serve as price switching mechanism or 
strategy since every increase in subsidy leads 
to increase in wholesale price margin and vice 
versa, and every increase in subsidy leads to 
reduction in retail price margin. Thus the 
manufacturer has the option of using wholesale 
price margin or subsidy to influence the retail 
price. Thus as the channel leader, the 
manufacturer can use subsidy to coordinate the 
channel. This ensures proper price control of 
the manufacturer’s product sold by the retailer 







Figure 2: The effect of subsidy on Payoff. 
 
We observe from Figure 2 that while the 
retailer’s payoff      increases with subsidy, 
the reverse is the case with the manufacturer’s 
payoff     . Thus at a certain subsidy level 
both payoffs become equal. Thus from (8) and 
(10) we have that equality of both payoffs would 
imply that 
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From (15) and (22) we have that 
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which implies that 
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or 
    
 √(        )                   
        
                  (  ) 
 
 
We note that √(        )                   , thus (24) is more appropriate.  
 
Now, we recall from (12) that the 
manufacturer’s wholesale price    increases 
with the subsidy rate   and vice versa. Thus 
increasing the wholesale price above (24) will 
lead to high subsidy which will eventually lead 
to the situation in Figure 2 where the provision 
of subsidy above a certain level will lead to the 
manufacturer’s payoff being lower than the 
retailer’s payoff. Thus appropriate wholesale 
price decision can be effectively used to decide 
appropriate subsidy rate, and subsequently 
coordinate the channel. 
 
Implication of Findings 
In this work we made the following contributions 
to the cooperative advertising literature: 
(i) We have added to the static game 
theoretic cooperative advertising 
literature, and obtained closed-form 
solutions of the models. 
(ii) Previous works in the literature always 
centre on using particular parameter(s) 
for channel coordination, but this work 
has shown that wholesale price margin 
and subsidy rate can be interchanged 
for channel coordination. In other 
words, any of them can be used 
instead of the other. An extension can 
consider incorporating other 
parameters/variables into the work. 
Further considerations can centre on 
switching or interchanging other 
parameters and/or variables in the 




This work shows that it is possible for the 
manufacturer to use advertising subsidy or 
appropriate wholesale price to influence the 
retail price, and subsequently coordinate the 
supply channel. However, it is not advisable to 
totally subsidise retail advertising. This should 
only be done if the retail margin is zero. 
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